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Recent Cases
ACCESSION-TIRES

TO MOTOR VEHICLES

Goodrich Silvertown Stores v. Brashear Freight Lines'
X sold a truclk to Y, taking a purchase money chattel mortgage thereon. The
mortgage was duly recorded 2 and noted on the certificate of title 3 of the vehicle.
Subsequently Y purchased tires and tubes from the plaintiff, giving a purchase
money chattel mortgage on these items as security for the unpaid purchase price.
Plaintiff recorded the mortgage on the tires and tubes, but did not have it noted on
the certificate of title of the truck. Y then sold the truck, with the tires and tubes
attached, to the defendant Freight Lines, which satisfied X's mortgage but not
that of the plaintiff, of which defendant had no actual notice. Plaintiff's demand
upon defendant for the return of the tires and tubes pursuant to the terms of the
mortgage was refused, and plaintiff brought this action for conversion. From a
judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant appeals, claiming: (1) that the Missouri
recordation statutes4 require not only that such mortgage be recorded or filed, but
that it be noted on the certificate of title of the vehicle in order to constitute constructive notice of such a mortgage to one otherwise a bona fide purchaser; and
(2) that the articles had, by accession, become an integral part of the vehiclo
and hence title passed to the defendant when it acquired title to the truck. Both
of these arguments were rejected by the court of appeals, and judgment for the
plaintiff was affirmed.
In support of the first contention, the defendant relied on the argument
that the pertinent portion of Missouri Revised Statutes (1939), § 3488, requiring
that mortgages on motor vehicles must be noted on the certificate of title or else
they "shall not be notice to the whole world," was meant to apply to situations
such as this, since such statute was "enacted to prevent fraud in the sale of motor
yehicles and to enable a purchaser to readily and quickly ascertain if there are
any mortgages affecting them."5 The court rejects this argument, inasmuch as the
statute is plain and unambiguous on its face, .tating that it applies only to
mortgages on6 motor vehicles.
Though there has been no previous holding in this state on the question of
1. 198 S.W. 2d 357 (Mo. App. 1946).
2. Pursuant to Missouri's general chattel mortgage recording statute. Mo.
REV. STAT. § 3486 (1939).
3. As required by Mo. REv. STAT. § 3488 (1939) stating in part that "A
mortgage on a motor vehicle shall not be notice to the whole world, unless the record
thereof is noted on the certificate of title to the mortgaged motor vehicle, as herein
provided."
4. The statutes are those cited' in footnotes 2 and 3.
5. Goodrich Silvertown Stores v. Brashear Freight Lines, 198 S.W. 2d 357,
359 (Mo. App. 1946).
6. Italics added.
(314)
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whether or not accessories such as demountable tires become a part of a motor
vehicle by accessiori, so that title to the accessory follows title to the principal
goods, the court rather summarily rejects the second contention of the defendant
The court quotes from Franklin Service Stations v. Sterling Motor Truck Co.,a case involving a sale of tires under a conditional sales contract:
"These tires were not an integral and permanent part of the truck;
they were temporary and separable attachments on the moving parts of the
truck; they could be removed without injury to the truck and used
elsewhere. .. . The automobile today is often assembled with parts bought
from different dealers, which are separable and replaceable. The practice
and course of business must be considered on the question of accession as
applied to automobiles."
This reasoning is adopted in toto by the Missouri court, and the resulting conclusion
is that there is no accession, and consequently no change in the title to the accessory.
Special emphasis is, placed by the court on the practice and course of business' in the
automobile industry.
The doctrine of accession had its source in the Roman Law, but is found
everywhere in the Anglo-American law." The general rule is: "...
when by labor
the materials of one person are united or joined to another's materials resulting in
a joint product, under the principle of accession the owner of the principal materials acquires the title to the joint product."O
But as with so many simply stated rules, it is not easy of application in
divergent fact situations. The problem of when there is a sufficient union of
products is susceptible of many answers; and the position of the parties who lay
claim to the article often determines the conclusion of the court in a particular
case. Efforts have often been made to set an adequate general rule. There have
been suggested such tests as relative value of the articles;1o whether there has been
a change of species;"' and whether the separate materials are identifiable.12 Because of the fiequency with which such questions arise in the field of motor vehicle
accessories, efforts to find special tests for this field have been numerous. The
usual test is whether the accessory can be identified and severed from the principal
part without material injury to either the accessory or the vehicle.' 3 This is the rule

7. 50 R.I. 336, 147 Atl. 754 (1929).
8. Lampton v. Preston, 1 J. J. Marshall 454 (Ky. 1829); and Lupton v.
White, 15 Ves. 432, 33 Eng. Rep. 817 (1808) are among the earliest Anglo-American
cases adopting this idea.
9. Twin City Motor Co. v. Rouzer Motor Co., 197 N.C. 371, 148 S.E. 461
(1929); 1 C.J.S. Accession § 4.
10. Lampton v. Preston, supra note 8. Contra: Hamlin v. Jerrard, 72 Me. 62
(1881).
11. Silsbury v. McCoon, 3 N.Y. 379, 53 Am. Dec. 307 (1850).
12. Eaton v. Munroe, 52 Me. 63 (1862).
13. The leading case setting forth this view is Clark v. Wells, 45 Vt. 47 (1872)
(involving wheels added to a wagon). The doctrine has been adopted in the
field of accessories to motor vehicles in Hallman v. Dothan Foundry and Machine
Co., 17 Ala. App. 152, 82 So. 642 (1919); Motor Credit Co. v. Smith, 24 S.W. 2d
974 (Ark. .1930); Passieu v. Goodrich, 58 Ga. App. 691, 199 S.E. 775 (1938);
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adopted by the Missouri court in the instant case, with a resultant conclusion that
"
there was no accession.
A different view is espoused in a few cases, the leading one of which is Blackwood Tire and Vulcanizing Co. v. Auto Storage Co.14 In that case the defendant
sold Ian automobile to one Cooper under a conditional sale arrangement. Cooper later
bought tires from the plaintiff on credit. The plaintiff retained no security interest in
the tires. Upon Cooper's default, defendant repossessed the automobile with the tires
attached. Cooper, at' the instigation of the plaintiff, then purported to resell the tires
to plaintiff. Claiming that thig subsequent transaction vested title to the tires in him,
plaintiff instituted a replevin action. From an adverse judgment, plaintiff appealed.
The judgment was affirmed. The court's ruling was grounded on the fact that the
seller of the accessories retained no title in them and hence the general principle
that repairs made by the mortgagor (or purchaser under a conditional sale) inure
to the.benefit of the mortgagee (or conditional seller) was not impugned.
The fallacy of this "retention of title" test is demonstrated by recalling that
the states vary" in their interpretation of the effect of conditional sale and chattel
mortgage transactions. Thus, in a situation involving the purchase money mortgagee or conditional seller of the accessory and the mortgagee of the vehicle (or,
as in the principal case, a purchaser from the mortgagor); the question of accession
would turn on the view taken of the effect of mortgages and conditional sales on
titles. If the jurisdiction in which the transaction took place holds that the
purchase morey mortgagee of the accessories got (or the conditional vendor retained)
title for security, 15 then the logical conclusion would be that there was no accession,
and the chattel mortgagee or conditional vendor of the accessory would prevail.
Conversely, in other states, which hold that the mortgagee receives only a legal
lien, 16 the decision logically will be that there has been accession, and the rights
of the mortgagee are defeated.
The test of."retention of title" is unsound. -It ignores the comparative merits
of the claims of the parties, their intentions, and the extent to which the accessory
has become an integral part of the vehicle. Though it reaches a proper result in
Clarke v. Johnson, 43 Nev. 359, 187 Pac. 510 (1920); K. C. Tire Co. v. Way
Motor Co., 143 Okla. 87, 287 Pac. 993 (1930); Franklin Service Stations v. Sterling
Motor Truck Co., 147 Atl. 754 (R. I. 1929).
14. Blackwood Tire and Vulcanizing Co. v. Auto Storage Co., 133 Tenn.
515, 182 S.W. 576 (1916). Accord: Diamond Service Station v. Broadway Motor
Co., 158 Tenn. 258, 12 S.W. 2d 705 (1929).
15. For a list of states so holding in the case of chattel mortgages, see 14 C.J.S.
Chattel Mortgages § 1, n. 7, 10. This is the usual holding in the case of conditional sales, Harkness v. Russell, 118 U. S. 663, 7 Sup. Ct. 51 (1886); VOLD,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES

(1931).

16. And such is the effect in Missouri. Adamson v. Fogelstrom, 221 Mo.
App. 1243, 300 S.W. 841 (1927); Olean Milling Co. v. Tyler; 208 Mo. App. 430,
235 S.W. 186 (1921). In some jurisdictions this is also the theory of a conditional
sale.' Clark v. Baker, 30 Colo. 199, 69 Pac. 506 (1901); Westinghouse Electric
Co. v. Auburn T. R., 106 Me. 349, 76 Ad. 897 (1910). It would also seem to be the
theory of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, adopted in several states. 2 UNIFORM
LAWS ANNOTATED, § 18.
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situations involving only the mortgagor of the vehicle and the mortgagee thereof,
it would often reach an undesirable conclusion when a third party becomes involved. In the principal case, the conclusion in a "lien theory" state would have
been that the tires became a part of the vehicle by. accession, with no sounder
basis than that the mortgagee of the tires got no "title," but a legal lien. In a "title
theory" state the result would be contra. Such a situation is patently unsatisfactory.
The "identifiability and severability" test seemingl9 adopted by the Missouri
court appears more acceptable, since it looks primarily to the degree of permanency
with which the accessory has been affixed. However, the intentions of the parties'
and the comparative merits of their claims should not be completely submerged to
any rule of law. Such is recognized by the Missouri court when they state, supra,
that "the practice and course of business must be considered."
Consideration of our problem may be aided at this point by the classification
of the various transactions in which the problem arises into typical situations
as to parties involved:
A. MORTGAGEE OF VEHICLE V. MORTGAGOR OF VEHICLE

Under such a test, where the sole parties to the controversy are the mortgagee
and mortgagor of the vehicle, the slightest degree of attachment is enough for the
mortgagee to prevail. 17 This conclusion is often aided by an after-acquired property
clause in the mortgage. 18 But even in the absence of such a provision, there is a
presumption that the mortgagor intended that the accessory should enhance the
9
security interest of the mortgagee.'
B. MORTGAGEE OF ACCESSORY v. MORTGAGOR OF ACCESSORY
If the parties be the owner of the automobile and the seller of the accessory
who retains a security interest therein, there should be no accession unless the
accessory has become completely unidentifiable or can be severed only with great
damage to the vehicle or the accessory. This logically follows from a recognition
that the normal business' dealings in the field of automobile accessories would be
seriously hampered by a ruling that the seller lost his security interest in the
accessory upon its attachment to the automobile, the very purpose for which it was
sold.
C. MORTGAGEE OF ACCESSORY V. PRE-EXISTING MORTGAGEE OF VEHICLE
Since a great portion of our motor vehicles are constantly subject to mortgages, and accessories such as tires are being constantly replaced, such disputes
17. In Purnell v. Fooks, 32 Del. 336, 122 Atl. 901 (1923), tires acquired by the
mortgagor and attached were awarded to the repossessing mortgagee of the truck.
18. As a general rule, this after-acquired property clause is sufficient between
the parties without any further act on the part of the mortgagee. See 14 C.J.S.
Chattel Mortgages § 26e, and. cases cited therein.
19. Holly v. Brown, 14 Conn. 254 (1841); Southworth v. Isham, 3 Sandf.
448 (N. Y. 1850); Clark v. Wells, 45 Vt. 3, 12 Am. Rep. 187 (1872). But see
Netzrog v. National Supply Co., 28 Ohio C. C. 112 (1905) holding such rule inapplicable where improvements were easily identifiable and separable.
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quite commonly arise. The seller of the accessory takes a purchase-money mortgage on the accessory, the purchaser attaches it to the previously mortgaged vehicle. Upon default in payments on the mortgage of the vehicle, the mortgageo
repossesses the vehicle with the encumbered accessories attached. In such a situation, there is no room for a presumption that the mortgagee of the accessory intended

to enhance the security interest of the mortgagee of the vehicle, and the mortgagee
of the vehicle did not rely upon the additional security of these accessories when
he entered his agreement. The great harm which would be done to the automobile
business by any other holding should constrain the courts to say that there was no
accession unless the identity of the vehicle and accessory have become almost
completely merged or that severance would do great injury to the vehicle or the
accessory.20

An additional complication is frequently added in such a situation by the
presence in the mortgage of the vehicle of an after-acquired property clause. Courts

have not been in complete accord in their analysis of the effect of such agreements.
Some say that these transfer no interest in praesenti, but operate only as specifically enforceable contracts to give a mortgage on the property when acquired;21
while others feel that they cause a lien to arise as soon as the property is acquired

and attached.22 If the first view is taken, the buyer of the accessory acquired no
title to which the seller of the vehicle could claim to succeed. Under the second,

the automobile encumbrancer is but a junior lienor,23 i.e., his lien attaches to the
encumbered accessory. Therefore, such a clause in the mortgage of the vehicle

should make no change,24 and only a very complete merger and loss of identity
should be sufficient to hold that the accessory seller has lost his rights under tho
25
principle of accession.

D.

MORTGAGEE OF ACCESSORY v. SUBSEQUENT ENCUMBRANCER OR PURCHASER
OF VEHICLE

The principal case is typical of this type of dispute. And the subsequent encumbrancer or purchaser of the vehicle has certainly relied upon the presence of the
accessories in determining the amount he would pay or loan. However, to rule that a
slight adjunction such as is necessary in the case of tires and tubes is sufficient to
preclude the mortgagee of the accessory would unnecessarily hamper the auto20. Hallman v. Dothan Foundry & Machine Co., 17 Ala. App. 152, 82 So.
642 (1919); Motor Credit Co. v. Smith, 181 Ark. 127, 24 S.W. 2d 974 (1930);
General Motors Truck Co. v. Kenwood Tire Co., 94 Ind. App. 25, 179 N.E. 394
(1932); Lincoln Road Equipment Co. v. Bolton, 254 N.W. 884 (Neb. 1934).
Contra: Twin City Motor Co. v. Rouzer, cited note 9 supra.
21. Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N. Y. 570, 37 N.E. 632 (1894).
22. Howell v. War Finance Corp., 71 F. 2d 237 (C.C.A. 9th 1934); Langford v. Fanning, 7 S.W. 2d (Mo. App. 1928), citing 14 C.J.S. Chattel Mortgages
§ 26e.
23. Manhattan Trust Co. v. Sioux City Cable Ry., 76 Fed. 658 (N.D. Iowa
1896).
24. As to purchasers without notice, see In Re Alabama Braid Corp., 13 F. Supp.
336 N.D. Ala. 1935), and as to intervening creditors, see Westinghouse Electric and
Mfg. Co. v. Brooklyn Rapid Transit Co., 291 Fed. 863 (N.D. N.Y. 1922).
25. See note 26, infra.
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mobile accessory business. The rule of accession should be tempered by a recognition of this course of business and the mortgagee of the accessory should prevail unless there is complete merger or removal of the accessory can be accomplished only
28
by doing considerable damage to the vehicle or the accessory.
The final consideration is the universal requirement that chattel mortgages be
recorded in order to constitute constructive notice to others. Recordation is immaterial in situations A and B, supra, since no problem of constructive notice is
presented. But where third parties are introduced, as in situations C and D,
failure to record may have serious consequences. As against a pre-existing mortgagee of the vehicle, the failure of the mortgagee of the accessory to retord his
mortgage frequently would not be fatal, since the mortgagee of the vehicle would
not seem to be within the classes protected by recordation statutes. 27 But if the
vehicle mortgagee forecloses, and then purchases at the foreclosure sale, he may be
held to be in the position of a subsequent purchaser, 28 a class always protected by
the recordation statute.
Failure of the seller of the accessories to properly record his mortgage will certainly deprive him of his protection against subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of the vehicle who have no actual notice of the mortgage or the accessories. 29 Such subsequent purchaser, in the absence of actual notice, would there-

fore take good title to the accessory. Interpretation of the applicable Missouri
statutes in the principal case indicates that proper recordation of a chattel mortgage
means merely recordation or filing in the case of the seller of the accessories; but
requires in addition notation on the certificate of title by the seller of the vehicle.
Of necessity, many questions are left unanswered. What if the accessory had
been an engine or the bed of a dump truck?30 And when, if ever, must the seller
of a given accessory have his mortgage or conditional sale agreement noted on the
certificate of title of the vehicle in order to be protected from subsequent purchasers
and encumbrancers? These, and other questions, must remain unanswered until
they are adjudicated.
M. HENCY
26. In Clark v. Wells, 45 Vt. 3 (1872) it was held that the conditional
seller of wheels and axles attached to a wagon purchased on conditional sale could
prevail over a subsequent bona fide purchaser from the repossessing vendor of the
wagon. (A fortiori, from the repossessing vendor of the wagon).
27. This is clearly the case in jurisdictions having the "subsequent purchaser
or encumbrancer" type of statute. Snyder v. Aker, 134 Misc. 721, 236 N.Y. Supp.
28 (Sup. 1929). Caveat in Missouri, since our statute says it shall not be valid
against "any other person than thfe parties thereto."
28. So held in Perkins v. Loan and Exch., Bank, 43 S.C. 39, 20 S.E. 759
(1895). Obviously, a third party purchasing from the repossessing mortgagee of
the vehicle at judicial sale is within the "subsequent purchaser" classification.
29. Haney v. Johnson, 132 Ark. 166, 200 S.W. 788 (1918); Cummings v.
Badger Lumber Co., 130 Mo. App. 557, 109 S.W. 68 (1908); Oyler v. Renfro, 86
Mo. App. 321 (1900).
30. Twin City Motor Co. v. Rouzer Motor Co., supra, note 9, held without
discussing the question, that an engine placed in an automobile passed to the repossessing conditional seller of the vehicle, precluding recovery by the conditional
seller of the engine.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol13/iss3/4
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PRIVILEGE AS EXiENDED TO

QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

Wlite v. United Mills Co., Inc.1
After discharging the plaintiff from its employ, defendant corporation filed
the required notice of separation with the unemployment compensation division of
the state of Kansas. The notice was to be preserved as testimony to be used at a

hearing conducted by the State Labor Commissioner. Plaintiff brought this action
and proved the notice to be libelous. Defendant contended that the communication
was sent to a quasi-judicial body and therefore, was absolutely privileged. It was
admitted that the commor law was in force in Kansas. The court upheld the
defendant's contention, determining that the commissioner in discharging his duties

of conducting hearings and subpoenaing witnesses was acting in a quasi-judicial
capacity. Concluding that the general or common law statement of absolute
privilege ". . . applies to communications made before tribunals having attributes
similar to those of courts," the court gavt judgment for the defendant. 2

Under the particular facts of the instant case, the Unemployment Compensation Law of Missouri would seem to hold such a communication absolutely
privileged.3 There has been no judicial decision in Missouri on this phase of the
statute, but it is declarative of the common law in other states. 4 Other than as to
proceedings coming within the above statute, the question of extending absolute
privilege to quasi-judicial proceedings must be resolved by the courts alone. Prior
to the instant case, the problem has been dealt with in Missouri only inferentially
by way of dictum.5 Presumably, the common law as declared by a Missouri court
to be in force in Kansas is the law applicable to comparable cases in Missouri, where

the law has, as yet, not been established. The Missouri cases deciding what public
officers exercise quasi-judicial discretion will, undoubtedly, prove useful in ascertaining the practical application of the doctrine of this case. c . However, as an aid

in resolving the exact question, the decisions of other jurisdictions must be relied
upon almost exclusively. The general rule elsewhere seems to be the one declared
7
by the court in this case.

1. 208 S.W. 2d 803 (Mo. App. 1948).
2. 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander, § 104(b).
3. Mo. REV. STAT: (1939) § 9426 (g): ". . . any report or statement written
or verbal made by any employing unit to the commission .. . shall be privileged
communications and no person, firm or corporation shall be held liable for slander

or libel on account of any such report or statement."
4. Cf. Nash v. Brooks, 276 N.Y. 75, 11 N.E. 2d 545 (1937); Higgins v.

Williams Pocahontas Coal Co., 103 W. Va. 504, 138 S.E. 112 (1927); see Bleecker
v. Drury, 149 F. 2d 770, 771 (C.A.A. 2d 1945).
5. See Brown v. Globe Printing Co., 213 Mo. 611, 643, 112 S.W. 462, 470

(1908).
6. Kirby v. Nolte, 349 Mo. 1015, 164 S.W. 2d 1 (1942); Mangieracina v.
Haney, 141 S.W. 2d 89 (Mo. 1940); State on Inf. McKittrick v. Wymore, 345

Mo. 169, 132 S.W. 2d 979 (1939).
7. See note 4 supra; Parker v. Kirkland, 298 Ill.
App. 340, 18 N.E. 2d 709
(1939); Shummway v. Warrick, 108 Neb. 652, 189 N.W. 301 (1922); Alagna v.
N.Y. and Cuba Mail S.S. Co., 155 Misc. 796, 279 N.Y. Sup. 319 (Sup. Ct. 1935);
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1948
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Invariably, the extension of the rule of absolute privilege to most quasi-judicial
bodies is said to be based upon the same considerations as exist in strictly judicial
proceedings. As stated by the Missouri Supreme Court in Laun v. Union Electric
the tendency and policy of the courts is to not extend the
Company, ". .
number or instances of absolute privilege unless the policy upon which privilege is
based is found to exist in the new situations."" Emphasizing that it is the occasion
which determines the privilege, and not the communication, the courts do not regard
every exercise of judicial discretion as an automatic criterion for invoking absolute
privilege.0 The facts of each case are viewed in the light of the dictates of public
benefit. ,Thus, where the state insurance commission exercised its discretion in
revoking an agent's license after a hearing, the court considered the likelihood,
that poor, ignorant people might be duped by unscrupulous agents. Therefore, it
decided that the benefit to the public from complete freedom of speech at the
0
hearing outweighed the possibility of harm to the licensee agent.' It would seem
to follow that the same jurisdiction might determine a communication in one quasijudicial proceeding as absolutely privileged, while not so privileged in another type
of quasi-judicial proceeding.
Some courts point out that, for efficacy of administration, absolute privilege
should extend to administrative bodies engaged in quasi-judicial proceedings. As
stated by the Texas court in Aikansas Harbor Terminal Railway. Company v.
Taber, "To deny protection to witnesses and complainants before the Commission
would result in the Commission being compelled to recognize and permit the right
of such witnesses to refuse to testify.""
Where administrative tribunals have tended to become more and more like
courts with a settled jurisdiction and rules of procedure and manned with law
trained personnel, the extension of absolute privilege to the proceedings would
seem to be for the public good.
NEDWYN

R. NELKIN

DOWER-IN ESTATE BY ENTIRETIES

Murawski v. Murawski'
A lot was conveyed to husband and wife thereby creating a tenancy by the
entireties. Subsequently, the wife was awarded a decree of divorce for the ltisband's
Wilson v. Whitacre, 4 Ohio CC 15 (1889); Independent Life Insurance Co. v.
Rodgers, 165 Tenn. 447, 55 S.W. 2d 767 (1933); Reagan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.,
140 Tex. 105, 166 S.W. 2d 909 (1942); Arkansas Harbor Terminal Ry. v. Taber,
235 S.W. 841 (Tex.1921); 136 A.L.R. 535 (1942); 42 COL. L. REV. 1286 (1942);
41 HARV. L. REv. 403 (1927); 40 MICH. L. REv. 919 (1942).
8. Laun v. Union Electric Co. of Mo., 350 Mo. 572, 578, 166 S.W. 2d
1065, 1069 (1942).
9. Fedderwitz v. Lamb, 195 Ga. 691, 25 S.E. 2d 414 (1943); Independent
Life Insurance Co. v. Rodgers, 165 Tenn. 447, 55 S.W. 2d 767 (1933).
10. Ibid.
11. 235 S.W. 841, 842 (Tex. 1921); accord note 10 supra; see Bleecker v.
Drury, 149 F. 2d 770, 771 (C.C.A. 2d 1945).
1. 209 S.W. 2d 262 (Mo. App. 1948).
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fault or misconduct. The former wife then brought an action of partition alleging
that because the divorce was granted her by reason of the misconduct of the husband
she had inchoate right of dower in his undivided one-half interest in the lot.
The right of the wife to dower is determined in Missouri by Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 318 (1939), the pertinent part of which is: "Every widow shall be endowed of the
third part of all the lands whereof her husband . . . was seized of an estate of
inheritance,at any time during the marriage, to which she shall not have relinquished
her right of dower, . . ." (Italics added.) Thus the wife had a right of inchoate
2
dower if the husband was seized of an estate of inheritance during coverture.
Although inchoate dower is a mere expectancy contingent on the wife surviving the
husband, it nevertheless possesses the elements of property and a wife may maintain
an action for its protection. 3
The instant case held that defendant was seized of an estate by the entireties
and that this is not an estate of inheritance. An estate of inheritance has been
defined in Missouri as: "An estate that will descend to a man's heirs by the simple
operation of law. .. ."
It is necessary to consider the nature of a tenancy by the entireties in order to
determine whether it is an estate of inheritance within the meaning of the above
definition. Tenancy by the entireties originated in" the common law where, as
husband and wife were considered as being but one person, they took the estate
as one person each being the owner of the whole.5 It differs from joint tenancy
in that the surviving spouse does not take the whole estate by the right of survivor2. AM. JUR., Dower, § 47.
3. Kober v. Kober, 324 Mo. 379, 23 S.W. 2d 149 (1929).
4: Casteel v. Potter, 176 Mo. 76, 75 S.W. 597 (1903). See 1 STEPH. COMM.
218 (1841); BLACx, LAW DICTIONARY 687 (3d ed. 1933).
5. Note, 4 Mo. L. REV. 73 (1939). Stewart v. Shelton, 201 S.W. 2d 395
(Mo. 1947); A. J. Meyer & Co. v. Schulte, 189 S.W. 2d 183 (Mo. App. 1945);
Magidson v. Stem, 235 Mo. App. 1039, 148 S.W. 2d 144 (1941); Schwind v. O'Hal-'
loran, 346 Mo. 486, 142 S.W. 2d 55 (1940); Baker v. Lamar, 140 S.W. 2d 31 (Mo.
1940); Hartford Fire Ins Co. v. Bleedorn, 235 Mo. App. 286, 132 S.W. 2d 1066
(1939); Greene v. Spitzer, 343 Mo. 751, 123 S.W. 2d 57 (1938); Ahmann v.
Kemper, 342 Mo. 944, 119 S.W. 2d 256 (1938); Fulbright v. Phoenix Ins, Co., 329
Mo. 207, 44 S.W. 2d 115 (1931); Samuel v. Frederick, 262 S.W. 713 (Mo. 1924);
I. R. Goldberg Plumbing Supply Co. v. Taylor, 209 Mo. App. 98, 237 S.W. 900
(1922); Wimbush v. Danford, 238 S.W. 460 (Mo. 1921); Lomax v. Cramer, 202
Mo. App. 365, 216 S.W. 575 (1919); Messenbaugh v. Goll, 198 Mo. App. 698, 202
S.W. 265 (1918); Ashbaugh v. Ashbaugh, 273 Mo. 353, 201 S.W. 72 (1918); Otto F.
Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 273 Mo. 159, 201 S.W. 67 (1918); Craig v. Bradley, 153 Mo. App. 586, 134 S.W. 1081 (1911); Holmes v. Kansas City, 209 Mo. 513,
108 S.W. 9 (1907); Frost v. Frost, 200 Mo. 474, 98 S.W. 527 (1906); Wilson v.
Frost, 186 Mo. 311, 85 S.W. 375 (1905); Bains v. Bullock, 129 Mo. 117, 31 S.W. 342
(1895); Russell v. Russell, 122 Mo. 235, 26 S.W. 677 (1894); Hall v. Stephens, 65
Mo. 670 (1877); Garner v. Jones, 52 Mo. 68 (1873); Gibson v. Zimmerman, 12
Mo. 385 (1849). 26 AM. JuR., Husband Wile, § 82; 2 BL. COMM. 182 (1822); 41
C.J.S., Husband and Wife, § 82; MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS, § 45
(1931); TIEDEMAN, REAL PROPERTY, § 181 (4th ed., Gill, 1924); 2 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY § 430 (3d., Jones, 1939); WARVELLE, REAL PROPERTY § 111 (3rd ed. 1909);
1 WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY § 911 (6th ed., Wurts, 1902).
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ship but because the original grant invested each grantee with the whole estate.8
Thus if either spouse dies the estate continues in the survivor, the only change
being in the person and not in the estate.7 As the surviving spouse remains the
,owner of the entire estate on the death of the other spouse it would seem that during
their joint lives neither spouse is "seized of an estate of inheritance" as, after his or
her death, the estate will not descend to his or her heirs by the simple operation
of law.8
The effect of the divorce decree, which was procured by the wife, was to destroy
the tenancy by the entireties and to vest in each of the parties title to the property
as tenants in common, 9 which is an estate subject to dower.10 The same act which

6. Note, 4 Mo. L. REV. 73 (1939); 'Magidson v. Stem, 235 Mo. App. 1039,
148 S.W. 2d 144 (1941); Baker v. Lamar, 140 S.W. 2d 31 (Mo. 1940); Schwind
v. O'Halloran, 346 Mo. 486, 142 S.W. 2d 55 (1940); Greene v. Spitzer, 343 Mo. 751,
123 S.W. 2d 57 (1938); Ahmann v. Kemper, 342 Mo. 944, 119 S.W. 2d 256 (1938);
Fulbright v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 329 Mo. 207, 44 S.W. 2d 115 (1931); I.R. Goldberg
Plumbing Supply Co. v. Taylor, 209 Mo. App. 98, 237 S.W. 900 (1922); Wimbush
v. Danford, 238 S.W. 460 (Mo. 1921); Messenbaugh v. Goll, 198 Mo. App. 698,
202 S.W. 265 (1918); Ashbaugh v. Ashbaugh, 273 Mo. 353, 201 S.W. 72 (1918);
Otto F. Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 273 Mo. 159, 201 S.W. 67 (1918); Craig
v. Bradley, 153 Mo. App. 586, 134 S.W. 1081 (1911); Frost v. Frost, 200 Mo. 474,
98 S.W. 527 (1906); Wilson v. Frost, 186 Mo. 311, 85 S.W. 375 (1905); Bains v.
Bullock, 129 Mo. 117, 31 S.W. 342 (1895); Garner v. Jones, 52 Mo. 68 (1873).
26 AM. JUR., Husband and Wife, § 82; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 430 (3d ed.,
Jones, 1939); WARVELLE, REAL PROPERTY § 111 (3d ed., 1909); 1 WASHBURN, REAL
PROPERTY § 912 (6th ed., Wurts, 1902).
7. Note, 4 Mo. L. REV. 73 (1939); Magidson v. Stem, 235 Mo. App. 1039,
148 S.W. 2d 144 (1941); Schwind v. O'Halloran, 346 Mo. 486, 142 S.W. 2d 55
(1940); Baker v. Lamar, 140 S.W. 2d 31 (Mo. 1940); Greene v. Spitzer, 343 Mo.
751, 123 S.W. 2d 57 (1938); Ahmann v. Kemper, 342 Mo. 944, 119 S.W.
2d 256 (1938); Fulbright v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 329 Mo. 207, 44 S.W. 2d 115
(1931); I. R. Goldberg Plumbing Supply Co. v. Taylor, 209 Mo. App. 98,
237 S.W. 900 (1922); Wimbush v. Danford, 238 S.W. 460 (Mo. 1921); Lomax
v. Cramer, 202 Mo. App. 365, 216 S.W. 575 (1919); Messenbaugh v. Goll, 198
Mo. App. 698, 202 S.W. 265 (1918); Ashbaugh v. Ashbaugh, 273 Mo. 353,
201 S.W. 72 (1918); Otto F. Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 273 Mo.
159, 201 .W. 67 (1918); Craig v. Bradley, 153 Mo. App. 586, 134 S.W. 1081
(1911); Frost v. Frost, 200 Mo. 474, 98 S.W. 527 (1906); Wilson v. Frost,
186 Mo. 311, 85 S.W. 375 (1905); Garner v. Jones, 52 Mo. 68 (1873). 26
AM. JUR., Husband and Wife, § 82; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 430 (3rd ed., Jones,
1939); WARVELLE, REAL PROPERTY § 111 (3rd ed: 1909); 1 WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY § 912 (6th ed., Wurts, 1902).
8. In TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 330 (Abridged Ed., Zollman, 1940) at page
340 it is said: "An estate by the entirety... is not an estate of inheritance but is an
estate of survivorship and hence the foundation of dower is lacking."
9. Cisel v. Cisel, 352 Mo. 1097, 180 S.W. 2d 748 (1944); Hiatt v. Hiatt, 168
S.W. 2d 1087 (Mo. 1943); Hemandez v. Prieto, 349 Mo. 658, 162 S.W. 2d 829
(1942); Jones v. Jones, 325 Mo. 1037, 30 S.W. 2d 49 (1930) State ex rel. Roll
v. Ellison, Judges, 290 Mo. 28, 233 S.W. 1065 (1921); Funk v. Funk, 205 Mo.
App. 178, 223 S.W. 780 (1920); Otto F. Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy,
273 Mo. 159, 201 S.W. 67 (1918); Aeby v. Aeby, 192 S.W. 97 (Mo. 1917); Holmes
v. Kansas City, 209 Mo. 513, 108 S.W. 9 (1907); Joerger v. Joerger, 193 Mo. 133,
91 S.W. 918 (1906). 26 AM. Jun., Husband and Wife, § 118; 2 BISHOP, MARRIAGE,

1651 (1891); MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 436 (3d ed., Jones, 1939);

DIVORCE AND SEPARATION §
LATIONS,

§ 45 (1931); 2
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invested the husband with an estate of inheritance also destroyed the marital
relationship. Thus the husband was not seized of an estate of inheritance "at any
time during the marriage." 1" The court therefore correctly ruled that the wife
did not have inchoate dower in the husband's one-ha/If interest in the property.
The principal case was one of first impression in Missouri and although' the
court cites no case authority directly in point for its decision, the courts of Arkansas
and Oregon have considered cases involving the same issue and reached the same
result as did the Kansas City Court of Appeals.12
In Roulston v. Hall,'3 one Hall and wife were tenants by the entireties at the
time the wife procured a divorce. At the termination of the divorce proceedings the
court decreed that the wife was entitled to one-half of said property and one-third
of the husband's one-half for her lifetime. The court relied on the Arkansas statute,
which provided: "... in every final judgment for divorce from the bonds of matrimony granted to ... the wife ...

against the husband, (the wife) shall be entitled

to one third part of the husband's personal property absolutely, and one third part
of all the lands whereof her husband was seized of an estate of inheritance, at any
time during the marriage, for her life, . . ." (Italics added.) It is to be noted that
although this statute is designed for a different purpose than Mo. REV. STAT. §

318 (1939), it also requires that the husband be seized of an estate of inheritance
during coverture. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that an estate by the entireties
is not an estate of inheritance and that the lower court erred in granting the wife
a life estate in one-third of the husband's one-half interest. The reasoning of the
Arkansas court was the same as that of the court in the principal case.
ROBERT L. Ross
LANDLORD AND TENANT-PERIODIC

TENANCY ARISING

FROM OCCUPANCY

UNDER VOID LEAsE-NOTICE TO TERMINATE

Vanderhoff v. Lawrence'
In the principal case, the Missouri Supreme Court held that, where a tenancy
from year to year arises by virtue of occupancy and payment of rent under an
WARVELLE, REAL PROPERTY §

111 (3rd ed., 1909); 1

WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY

§ 916 (6th ed., Durts, 1902). See Note, 52 A.L.R. 890 (1928).
10.

Mo. REV. STAT. § 340 (1939).

11. Mo. REv. STAT. § 318 (1939).
12. Roulston v.Hall; 66 Ark. 305, 50 S.W. 690 (1899); Schafer v. Schafer,
122 Ore. 620, 260 Pac. 206 (1927). In the latter case a husband and wife owned
certain realty as tenants by the entireties. The wife procured a divorce making
them tenants in common. The Oregon statute was construed to mean that the
party on whose prayer the divorce was granted was entitled to one-third of the
property in which the other spouse held an estate of inheritance during coverture.
The court, citing Roulston v. Hall, supra, held that a tenancy by the entireties
is not an estate of inheritance and that since the husband did not become a tenant
in common until the divorce decree was rendered terminating the marital relationship, he was not seized of an estate of inheritance during coverture and therefore
the statute was not applicable.
13. 66 Ark. 305, 50 S.W. 690 (1899).

14. Sand. & H. Dig., § 2517 (1894).
1.,206 S.W. 2d 569 (Mo.1947).
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oral lease of farm lands which is void under the statute of frauds, no notice is required to terminate the tenancy at the end of the period stipulated in the void
2
oral lease. The decision affirms that of the Kansas City Court of Appeals.
Plaintiff and defendant made an oral contract on Jan. 24; 1945, whereby defendant was to lease the farm in question from Mar. 1, 1945, to Mar. 1, 1946. Defendant went- into possession in February, having already paid a portion of the rent
due. No notice to vacate the premises was given before Mar. 1, 1946, and defendant
remained in possession past that date. Plaintiff brought an action for unlawful
detainer. A jury was waived and the issues were found by the trial court. At the
trial, defendant claimed the original agreement was that he was to have the
place as long as he wanted it, perhaps for four or five years. However, the court
found the agreement was for a term of one year ending Mar. 1, 1946. On appeal,
defendant claimed that the contract was void under the statute of frauds and that
therefore a tenancy at will arose which became a tenancy from year to year upon
occupation and payment of rent. As a tenant from year to year, defendant claimed
the tenancy could be terminated only by notice sixty days prior to the end of the
year. Plaintiff claimed no notice was necessary, since the date of termination was
set in the agreement. The Kansas City Court of Appeals found that no notice was
necessary, but certified the case to the supreme court because of a possible conflict
with a decision of the Springfield Court of Appeals.3
The Missouri statute of frauds provides that "No action shall be brought.
upon any agreement that is not to be performed within one year from the making
thereof, unless the agreement upon. which the action shall be brought, or some
memorandum or note thereof, -shall be in writing." 4 The statutory period begins at
the time the contract is made, not at the time performance is to begin. 5 Since the
performance was not to be completed until some fifteen months after the contract
was made, it is clear that the agreement falls within the statute of frauds.,
However, entry into possession and payment of rent under such a void agreement does create a tenancy from year to year.7 Where a tenancy from year to year
arises under such an agreement, the terms of the agreement will govern the conditions of the tenancy, except as to the duration thereof. s It has been held that

2. Vanderhoff v. Lawrence, 201 S.W. 2d 509 (Mo. App. 1947).
3. Coleman v. Fletcher, 188 S.W. 2d 959 (Mo. App. 1945).
4. Mo. REV. STAT. § 3354 (1939). Apparently the decision of the court is
based entirely on this section, and not on the lease section (§ 3352), of the
statute of frauds.
5. Hamilton v. Fred Miller Brewing Co., 125 Mo. App. 579, 102 S.W. 1088
(1907); Womach v. Jenkins, 128 Mo. App. 408, 107 S.W. 423 (1908); Reeder

v. Sayre, 70 N.Y. 180 (1877).

6. This seems to be the general rule in those states which follow the original
English Statute of Frauds. 49 AM. Jun. 384. Contra in those states which do not
follow the original English statute. 37 C.J.S. 602.
7. Fisher v. Lape, 176 S.W. 2d 871 (Mo. App. '1944); Kerr v. Clark, 19

Mo. 132 (1853); 51 C.J.S. 742.

8. Williams v. Deriar, 31 Mo. 13, 18 (1860); Ferri v. Liberatoscioli, 338 Pa.
454, 13 A. 2d 45 (1940). Contra: Ragsdale v. Lander, 80 Ky. 61 (1882).
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the terms of the agreement govern the amount of rent,9 the division of crops,' 0 the
condition in which the premises are to be left," the liability for repairs, 12 and the
time of payment of the rent.' 3
In Missouri, a tenancy from year to year may be terminated by either party
upon notice given 60 days before the end of any year. 14 In Coleman v. Fletcher,
the statement is made that a tenancy from year to year can be terminated by the
landlord only by notice given 60 days prior to the end of the year.' " Since this
statement conflicts with the decision of the Kansas City Court of Appeals, in the
instant case, this case was certified to the supreme court.
There are three situations in which the question of termination of a tenancy from
year to year may be involved: where the tenancy is for an indefinite period; where
it is for a definite period but one party wishes to terminate it before the end of
that period; and where it is for a definite period and the tenant remains in possession for the entire period. It appears that the length of the period set is immaterial,
if the circumstances are such that a tenancy from year to year arises.'0
In affirming the decision of the court of appeals, the supreme court pointed out
that a statement like that in Coleman v. Fletcher appears in many cases. However,
examination reveals that "the rule was applied to oral contracts of rental for an
indefinite term, or where no notice had been given and the period fixed by the
oral agreementhad not expired. " 17 In those cases in which the tenant remained
in possession for the full period of the oral letting, as in the instant case, no notice
is required to terminate the tenancy'1
In Missouri, it is possible to justify such a distinction on the basis of the statutory statement that "No notice to quit shall be necessary from or to a tenant
whose term is to end at a certain time, or when, by special agreement, notice is
dispensed with."' 9 Thus, where an oral contract specifies the date of termination,
no notice is required, even though the contract is void under the statute of frauds,
9. Cole v. Bunch, 85 Okla. 38, 204 Pac. 119 (1921).
10. Snyder v. Harding, 38 Wash. 666, 80 Pac. 789 (1905).
11. Martin v. Smith, L.R. 9 Ex. 50, 8 Eng. Rul. Cas. 646 (1874).
12. Bergamo v. Tarello, 183 Il1. App. 314 (1913).
13. Norris v. Morrill, 40 N.H. 395 (1860).
14. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 2969 (1939). At common law, six months notice was
required. Doe v. Porter, 3 Term R. 13, 100 Eng. Rep. 429 (1789). When the
term is for a fraction over an exact number of years, a question arises as to
whether the tenancy from year to year arises as of the date of the commencement
of the tenancy, or as of the contemplated terminal date. By English authority,
notice to terminate must be given according to the terminal date. Doe ex dem
Rigge v. Bell, 5 T.R. 471, 101 Eng. Rep. 265, 15 Eng. Rul. Cas. 596 (1793). But
in this country the tenancy arises as of the date of commencement. Coudert v.
Cohn, 118 N.Y. 309, 23 N.E. 298, 7 L.R.A. 69, 16 Am. St. Rep. 761 (1890).
15. Supra, note 3, at 962.
16. Vanderhoff v. Lawrence, 201 S.W. 2d 509 (Mo. App. 1947).
17. Vanderhoff v. Lawrence, supra, note 1, at 570.
18. Ray v. Blackman, 120 Mo. App. 497, 97 S.W. 212 (1906); Butts v. Fox,
96 Mo. App. 437, 70 S.W. 515 (1902); 32 AM. JUR. 73.
19. Mo. REv. STAT. § 2972 (1939).
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since the foregoing section is not limited by its provisions to contracts not affected
20
by the statute of frauds.
However, it would seem that the rule set out in the instant case is fully
justified even in the absence of such a statutory provision as above. Where a
tenant enters into possession under an oral agreement, and both landlord and
tenant fully comply with all the other stipulations of the agreement, there seems
to be no reason to hold that they should not also be bound by the stipulation as to
the termination of the agreement. The same considerations which permit taking
a case out of the statute of frauds because of part performance would seem to
fully justify a decision such as that here.
The principal difficulty in this type of case is in determining the fact as to
whether the parties actually intended to fix a terminal date. Where the letting
is for "a year" from and after March 1, 1945, does that mean, in the minds of the
ordinary landowner and tenant farmer, "from March 1, 1945, to Feb. 28, 1946, inclusive," or does it mean for an indefinite number of years, each one to commence on
March 1? This question must be answered in every case of this type, and upon
the answer will depend the requirement or non-requirement of notice to terminate.
In this case, the "trial court found as a fact that the parties had fixed a definite
terminal date; had the opposite finding been reached, there seems no escape from
the conclusion that notice of termination would have been required.
JOSEPH

J.

RUSSELL

MASTER AND SERvANT-THE FELLOW SERVANT RULE AND THE MASTER'S
MAINTAIN

DUTY

TO

A SAFE PLACE TO WORK

Graczak v. City of St. Louis'
Plaintiff and Boubek, defendant's employees, were engaged in punching holes
in some iron links by the use of a steam hammer and a die. The hammer Was operated by Boubek by means of levers. When the necessary preparations had been
made, plaintiff, facing Boubek at a distance of about three feet, would hold the
box and link in place by the die box arm. On plaintiff's signal, Boubek would
operate the lever, driving the punch through the link. In addition to the use of
oral signals, a nod of the head was the signal to bring the hammer down and holding
up the hand signaled a halt. On the occasion in question the men were at their
stations when plaintiff noticed that there was no white lead on the punch (the
punch was dipped in white lead every tenth punch and when the die was changed).
Plaintiff put up his right hand and said, "Halt." Plaintiff reached in to take the
plunger out when the hammer came down on his hand, injuring it. Plaintiff brought
suit to recover damages for such injury. Judgment having been given for plaintiff,
defendant appeals. Held: Reversed.
This case presented again to the court the perplexing problem of the extent to
which the doctrine of the master's nondelegable duties impinges upon the fellow
20.

Ray v. Blackman, supra, note 18.

1. 202 S.W. 775 (Mo. 1947).
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servant rule. The plaintiff contended' that Boubek's failure to heed. and to give
customary signals and warnings was a breach of the defendant's nondelegable duty
to provide plaintiff with a reasonably safe place in which to work. Defendant
contended that there was no breach of his duty to provide a safe place in which
to work; that Boubek and plaintiff were fellow servants, and therefore there could
be no recovery.
Every time a servant is injured, the place where he is working is unsafe for the
time being. But if the master's duty to maintain a safe place in which to work may
be invoked in all such cases, the effect bf the fellow servant rule would be completely nullified. Some line must be drawn between the two opposing doctrines.
As the law now stands, in other jurisdictions as well as in Missouri, the course
of that line is not easily ascertained. The general rule is that the master has not
breached his duty to maintain a safe place in which to work when an employee is
injured by the negligence of a fellow servant in the performance of the operative
details of the master's business.- The question has arisen, however, as to whether
the master may be held liable, not because of the manual act which caused the injury, but because of failure of the delinquent servant to give a warning before he
did the act. There are a group of Missouri cases holding that the fact that the
injury could have been prevented by a warning doesn't affect the rule that the
master is not liable when the injury is caused by a fellow servant of the plaintiff
in the performance of an operative detail of the work.3 On the other hand, the
case of Gettys v. Anerican Car & Foundry Co.,4 on which plaintiff in the instant
case relied, held the master liable for the failure of plaintiff's fellow servant to ,warn
plaintiff of an act, incident to an operative detail of the work, which caused the
injury, when there was a custom to give such warning.
In the Gettys case defendant was a manufacturer of steel cars. Plaintiff and one
Jackson were working inside a car, Jackson reaming holes in a cover plate resting
on center sills and plaintiff driving rivets with a pneumatic hammer. The two men
started at opposite ends of the car and worked toward each other, eventually meeting at the center. The pneumatic hammer created a noise; the reamer was practically noiseless. When the men approached each other Jackson failed to warn
plaintiff of his proximity, which, according to plaintiff's evidence, was customary.
Thereamer caught plaintiff's clothing and body and twisted his hand off.. In
affirming judgment for plaintiff the Missouri Supreme Court said, "The practice
and custom of warning of his presence when the reamer, in the course of his work,
came near or close to the riveter, had evolved from the work and was in effect
equivalent to a rule. The duty to warn thus devolved on the corporation. This nondelegable duty was by force of circumstarnces and custom intrusted to the reamer.
The theory of the corporation's liability was not the manual act of Jackson in han-

2.

RESTATEMENT, AGENCY

§ 474, comment b (1933).

3. State ex rel. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Haid, 323 Mo. 9, 18 S.W.
2d,478 (1929); Richardson v. Mesker, 171 Mo. 666, 72 S.W. 506 (1903); Burge v.
American Car & Foundry Co., 274 S.W. 842 (Mo. App. 1925).
4. 322 Mo. 787, 16 S.W. 2d 85 (1929).
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dling and operating the reamer, but it was the failure of Jackson, the alter ego o'f
defendant and acting for it, to warn plaintiff of the proximity of the reamer so
that he might protect himself." 5
If the court accepted the reasoning in the Gettys case it would be difficult to
reach a contrary decision, for the holding was based on facts identical with those
in the present case-violation of a "practice and custom" to warn. The court
chose to reject the reasoning of the Gettys case as to warnings. It quoted Labatt,
Master and Servant, as follows: "And on warnings: 'The general principle that
the master's duty to provide a safe place to work is not deemed to have been
violated where the unsafety is caused solely by the acts of coservants in carrying
out the details of the work clearly involves the corollary that the master is not
chargeable with the failure of those servants to warn each other as to the existence of dangerous conditions'which have already supervened.' 4 Labatt, Sec. 1531.
And: 'Frequent attempts have been made to bring the negligence of servarits deputed
to give signals within the scope of the principle that the duty to maintain a safe
place of work is nondelegable. But this contention is rejected (except in Washington. . ).' 4 Labatt Sec. 1537."6 This would seem to be the better view.
Failure to give a warning is merely evidence of negligence on the part of the one
on whom rests the duty to exercise care in doing the manual act, and should be
no basis for imposing a duty on a different person.
The court next construed the facts in the Gettys case as creating a situation
where "an independent act of another employee not connected with the detail
of the work under performance by thne plaintiff made the place of work unsafe and
caused the injury," while in the instant case "plaintiff's injury was attributable to
. .. the negligence of a competent fellow employee in an operative detail of the
work they were engaged in at the time."7 (Italics added) No satisfactory explanation is given why the fact that the act causing the injury was not connected with
the operative details of the work under performance by the plaintiff should result
in liability by the master. It may possibly be an extension of the theory underlying
the "different department" or "consociation" test, which is used to determine
whether two employees are fellow servants. This test has been stated as follows:
"... they are coservants who are so related and associated in their work that they
can observe and have an influence over each other's conduct, and report delinquencies to a common correcting power; and they are not coservants who are engaged
in different and distinct departments of work." s In the Gettys case the servant injured and the servant causing the injury were coservants within the "different
department" rule, and yet the act which resulted in the injury was "not connected
with the details of the work under performance by the plaintiff." So it appears
that the intimacy of the connection between the work of the employee causing the
5. Id. at 799, 16 S.W. 2d at 89.
6. Op. cit. supra note 1, at 777.
7. Id. at 779, 780.
8. Relyea v. Kansas City, Fort Scott & Gulf Railroad Co., 112 Mo. 86, 20

S.W. 480 (1892).
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injury and that of the employee injured must be gieater to relieve the master of
liability for' breach of his duty to maintain a safe place in which to work, than to
relieve him of liability under the doctrine or respondeat superior by invoking the
fellow servant rule.
A brief review of the various steps in the development of the law of the master's liability to his servants is necessary to show more clearly the present status of
the law in Missouri. The first step was the placing of a limitation on the doctrine
of respondeat superior-the rule that the master is liable for the torts of his servant
committed while acting within the scope of his employment. The doctrine of
respondeat superior was said not to be applicable when the person injured was a
fellow servant of'the employee who caused the injury. The extent to which this
limitation would affect the relative rights and liabilities of the parties depended,
of course, on the definition given to the term "fellow servant." Those were said
to be fellow servants who were employed and paid by a common employer and
engaged in a common service. They were engaged in a common service if they
were working in the same general enterprise. The first case decided in Missouri
held that the engineer of a train, who was injured when a bridge collapsed, was a
fellow servant of those who built the bridge. 9
Almost immediately there developed the feeling that the courts had gone too
far in restricting the rights of servants, and the means adopted to rectify this
error was to redefine the term fellow servants as those who were working, in the
same "department."' °
The next development pertinent here took the form of fixing personal duties
of the master to his servants, which are known generally as the master's nondelegable duties."3 There has been a gradual extension of the application of the theory
of nondelegable duties in favor of the employee, the manner in which the court
in the instant case justified the Gettys case being the latest extension of liability
on the ground of a breach of a particular one of those duties-the duty to maintain
a safe place in which to work. The theory of nondelegable duties should not be
considered as a limited application of the doctrine of respondeat superior. That this
is so is evidenced by the fact that liability resulting-from breach of the master's non9. McDermott v. Pacific Railroad Co., 30 Mo. 115 (1860).
10. Op. cit. supra note 8. The court in the McDermott case, supra note 9,
had suggested that the basis of the fellow servant rule might be (1) to 8ecure diligence on the part of the servants, (2) implied contract, or (3) public policy. The
first is now embraced in the "different department" rule. See the dissenting opinion
of Judge Thomas in Parker v. The Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Co., 109 Mo.
362, 19 S.W. 1119 (1892) for a good discussion of the development of the law
in Missouri up to that time.
11. Thomas v. American Sash & Door Co., 14 S.W. 2d 1 (Mo. Sup. 1929)
(duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work); Amis v. Standard Oil Co. of
Indiana, 233 S.W. 195 (Mo. 1921) (to provide employees with reasonably safe
appliances); Levecke v. Curtis & Co. Mfg. Co., 197 Mo. App. 262, 193 S.W. (1917)
(to provide an adequate number of servants); Jarrell v. Blackbird Block Coal Co.,
15-4 Mo. App. 552, 136 S.W. 754 (1911) (to adopt a reasonably safe method of
work).
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delegable duties is not restricted by the fellow servant rule. 12 It is true that the
master who delegates to a servant the performance of an act which the master is
under a duty to perform with care is liable for the servant's negligent performance,
just as the master is liable for the negligent performance of an act by a servant within the scope of his employment in cases where the doctrine of respondeat superior
is applicable. But the master is liable for the breach of a personal (nondelegable)
duty because that duty has not been discharged, whether it be because of an
omission to do the required act, or a negligent doing of the act by the master or by
a servant. Liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior, on the other hand,
springs from the identification of the servant with the master. In the former case
the relationship between the master and the servant which makes it possible to hold
the master liable for the acts of the servant results from the duty,' 3 while in the
latter case the duty results from the relationship.
Accordingly, it is necessary in this state of the law to approach a particular set
of facts from two distinct angles-to determine whether the master is liable under
the doctrine of respondeat superior as limited by the fellow servant rule, and to
determine whether he is liabledunder the doctrine of nondelegable duties. But
under the theory of the instant case it would seem-when it is claimed that, upon
one employee injuring another, the master has breached his nondelegable duty to
maintain a safe place in which to work-that a single determination of the degree
of connection between the work of the two employees would determine simultaneously whether the doctrine of respondeat superior and the doctrine of nondelegable duties were applicable. In cases where the master is not liable for a
breach of his duty to maintain a safe place in which to work, he would not be
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, since the greater degree of connection would include the lesser.
ALVIN C. RANDALL
TAXATIoN-PAYMENT

FOR

DOWER-INCOME

TO

HUSBAND

Le Croy v. Cook'
In 1911, Le Croy and his wife entered into an oral contract providing that
whenever the wife joined in a conveyance of her husband, or otherwise released
or relinquished her dower rights, she was to receive one-third of the proceeds as
compensation for the dower rights so released. During 1939 and 1940, Le Croy
12. Further evidence that nondelegable duties are independent of the doctrine of respondeat superior is the fact that landowners owe similar duties to business guests. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, chap. 14, topic 4, title 6, introductory note
(1933).
13. "He is viewed ... solely as the medium through which the culpable violation of duty operated to the injury of the plaintiff." 4 LABATT'S, MASTER AND
SERVANT § 1468 (2d ed. 1913). In this view of the matter, it would seem to be
erroneous to call the servant, who has been delegated the performance of an act
which the master is under a nondelegable duty to perform with care, the alter ego
of the master.
1. 204 S.W. 2d 173 (Ark. 1947).
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conveyed several tracts of land. In all but one instance, she joined in her husband's
conveyance and the entire consideration presumably was paid to him, after which
he transferred one-third of the amount to her. In a single instance, in 1940, she
did not join in the conveyance by her husband, but three months later executed
a separate deed to the purchaser, for which she received four hundred dollars
directly from him.
The Arkansas Revenue Commissioner deemed the sums so received by the
wife to be taxable income to the husband, and upon his refusal to pay, a distraint
warrant was issued. This is an action to enjoin the enforcement of that warrant
on the ground that the sums paid to the wife for the relinquishment of her dower
were income to her and not to the husband.
In affirming the action of the revenue commissioner, the Arkansas Supreme
Court reviews the nature of dower inchoate2 It is a valuable right. 3 But, being
inchoate, it cannot be, in a proper sense, conveyed. Rather, it is a future contingent right, which is relinquished to the grantee of her husband.4 Therefore, rcasons the court, the manner of release is of no concern. She may release her interest
by joining in her husband's conveyance or by separate instrument receiving the
compensation directly from the grantee, the result is still the same. And it is immaterial that she has a valid, subsisting contract with her husband that she shall
receive a portion of the sales price as the price for relinquishing her interest. In all
of these instances, says the Arkansas court, the payments to her are, nevertheless,
notktng more than gifts.5

The author frankly admits that the reasoning of the court escapes him. With
the statement that the manner of.release is immaterial, he is in full accord, since
the substance of the transaction remains the same. But the conclusion that the
payments which she eventually receives for the release of her dower are but gifts
from her husband has no supportable rationale. The court itself quotes from
Ilershy v. LathamG which held in part: "A wife's relinquishment of dower, or her
cession of any other rights of property, is a sufficient consideration for a settlement upon her by her husband out of his own property."7 Yet a payment by a
third party to the wife for relinquishing her dower is income to the husband
and passes to her only by way of gift from the husband.
2. The Arkansas statute is Pope's Dig. § 4396 (1937), providing: "A widow
shall be endowed of a third part of all the lands whereof her husband was seized
of an estate of inheritance (a) at any time during the marriage, unless the same
shall have been relinquished in legal form." Missouri's basic statute, Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 318 (1939) is substantially the same.
3.. B. H. and M. Oil Co. v. Graves, 182 Ark. 659, 32 S.W. 2d 630 (1930).
Accord: Firebaugh v. Wittenberg, 309 Ill.
536, 141 N.E. 379 (1923), reverring 227
Ill. App. 77 (1922); Vantage Mining Co. v. Baker, 170 Mo. App. 457, 155 S.W.
466 (1913).
4. The terms of the Arkansas statute, supra note 1, so provide. Accord:
Lemon v. Lemon, 273 Mo. 484, 201 S.W. 103 (1918); Durrett v. Piper, 58 Mo.
551 (1875).
5. Italics added.
6. 46 Ark. 542 (1885).
7. Id. headnote 1.
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The first federal case involving the problem was Frank v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue.8 In that case, the husband and wife were separated, and divorce
proceedings had been instituted. The wife refused to join in a conveyance of
certain property unless she received compensation, so a written agreement was
drawn up. The agreement recited "unhappy differences" had arisen and that the
wife would not join to release dower unless she received one-half of the proceeds.
The commissioner whom the Board of Tax Appeals0 upheld, assessed the entire
sale price as income to the husband; ruling that the money paid to the wife
was alimony, and hence income to the husband. The circuit court of appeals reversed, and held the money paid to the wife was .income to her. They ruled:
(1) it was not, on the facts, a payment of alimony; and (2) it was not a gift
to the wife, but the price of her interest in the intestate rights in the property,
citing several cases from the jurisdiction in which the transaction took place (Pennsylvania) so holding.' 0 There is no significant difference in the nature of dower
in Pennsylvania and in Arkansas. And the Arkansas case cited supra"1 and approved by the court, holds that in Arkansas dower is an equally valuable right.12
The Arkansas decision would seem to be in direct conflict with the only
federal case on the matter; and is certainly much less satisfactory in its reasoning.
But a more recent Board of Tax Appeals decision, 13 under a set of facts indistinguishable from either the principal case or the Frank case, held that money
paid directly to the wife for relinquishing her dower, was taxable income to the
husband. They reasoned that the transaction was nothing more than a tax avoidance scheme; since the allowance of such a transaction would result in the husband's paying to the wife whatever gain he made on the sale. The board "distinguished" the Frank case, saying that all the court there decided was that the
payment to the wife was not alimony. Ignored was the specific ruling therein
that the payment to the wife was not a gift, but the price of the wife's inchoate
property interest.'4 Unfortunately, the petition for review of the board's decision
was dismissed, not on its merits, but for failure of the appellant to prosecute.' 5
If, in fact, the payment of money to the wife for releasing her dower is a
scheme for tax avoidance, then the court may properly look through the transaction,
no matter what form it takes. But to say that begs the very question involved.
If dower is a valuable and alienable interest, though inchoate and defeasible,
then it is hardly tax avoidance to accept consideration for that valuable interest.
The Arkansas and Board of Tax Appeals holdings are, in logic, unsupportable.

8.
9.
10.
283 Pa.
(1874).
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

51 F. 2d 923 (C.C.A. 3rd 1931).
Report unavailable.
Heckman's Estate, 299 Pa. 369, 149 At]. 646 (1930); Hannan v. Carroll,
61, 128 Atl. 657 (1925); Burk's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 141, 15 Am. Rep. 587
Hershy v. Latham, supra note 6.
See cases cited note 3, supra.
Digan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 35 B.T.A. 256 (1937).
Italics added.
Dismi~sed by C.C.A. 2d, August 31, 1937, for non-prosecution.
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But where matters of revenue are involved, the governments have been as ingenious in upholding taxes as the taxpayers have been in their attempts to decrease the tax burden. Hence the decision of the court in the principal case comes
as no surprise to a student of taxation.
And with joint returns and tax-splitting scheduled to be the rule under the
new federal tax statute, there would not be many cases where the "tax avoidance
scheme" would benefit the federal taxpayer under a contrary rules anyway.1 6
MACK HENCY
TAxATioN-REcOVERY OF TAX PAID ON UNAUTHOMZED

BONUS

Gargaro v. United States
Plaintiff sued to recover'income taxes paid by him in 1942. In 1942 plaintiff
was an officer and employee of Gargaro Co., Inc., a Michigan corporation. An agreement between the company and plaintiff provided that plaintiff was to receive a stipulated salary, plus a bonus consisting of 10% of the net profits of the company
for that year. The company made a profit in 1942 and plaintiff was paid his bonus.
Plaintiff paid an income tax on this amount. In August, 1944 the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation Price Adjustment Board initiated renegotiation proceedings
against the company with respect to amounts realized by that company during
1942 under contracts with governmental agencies. In March, 1945 it was agreed

that the company was to refund a certain amount to the government. The refund
was made. Plaintiff was requested and he did repay a proportionate amount to
the company.
Plaintiff contended that from the time of payment of the excess bonus, he
was obligated to repay it because it was paid by the company and received by the
plaintiff under a mutual mistake of fact as to what was the true net income of

the company for 1942. The government demurred to the complaint and argued
that as plaintiff received the money in 1942 under a claim of right, and without
restriction as to its disposition, the amount was properly included as income for
1942.
The court, in an opinion by Madden, J., overruled the demurrer and noted
that a taxable gain was conditioned upon (1) the presence of a claim of right
to the alleged gain, and (2) the absence of a definite, unconditional obligation to
repay or, return that which would otherwise constitute a gain.2 Here, plaintiff's
claim of right was said to be neutralized by the fact that he was ignorant of
the relevant facts. The absence of a definite unconditional obligation to repay was
16. Exceptions, for example, would be where a divorced wife receives payment
for release of a dower interest she still holds, or where separate returns are filed in
order to get the benefit of increased capital loss deductions under INTERNAL REvENUE CODE § 117 (d) (2).
1. 73 F. Supp. 973 (Ct. of Claims, 1947).
2. This was the test enunciated in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Wilcox, 327 U. S. 404, 66 Sup. Ct. 546 (1946).
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due only to the fact that the governmental agency had not yet exercised its statutory
discretion to initiate renegotiation proceedings. The definite obligation to repay
arose after the deductions had been made by the Board.
In a dissenting opinion, Whitaker, J., says there was no mutual mistake at the
time the bonus was given as it was based on the company's true income. The
thought that the government might demand a refund was only contingent, speculative and imaginary. "Tax liability is determined on the basis of the facts at hand
or ascertainable at the close of the taxable year, not on what may happen in the
future."
The principle case raises the general question of unauthorized and illegal receipt of money by the taxpayer. 3 Generally gains from unlawful business or gains
that are unauthorized have been taxed. Thus if a gain results from a usurious
4
transaction which is illegal, it is still taxable in the hands of the receiving party.
Even though the income is received under a statute which is subsequently declared
unconstitutional, the amount is taxable.5 Income taxes paid by lessee for lessor
under a contract making payment of taxes a duty of the lessee, became income
taxable to the lessor even though such contract was subsequently held not to bind
the lessee to pay income taxes.6 A judgment creditor who receives payment on
the judgment and then is compelled to return the same to his debtor when the
case is reversed, has been held to have sustained a taxable gain.7 And when a
taxpayer must return dividends received under a ultra vires stock allotment plan,
the amount received is taxable in the year received.8 A shareholder who receives
proceeds from the liquidation of a corporation's assets, such proceeds representing
a profit over the original investment, and who pays the tax on such profits and
subsequently returns a portion in order to allow the corporation to meet a deficiency
assessment levied against it, is held to have no right to recover his excess payment.9
Embezzlement cases seem to be an exception to the general rule set forth

3. For collections of cases see 43 A.L.R. 799 (1926), 51 A.L.R. 1026 (1927),
and 166 A.L.R. 884 (1947).
4. Barker v. Magruder, 68 App. D. C. 211, 95 F. 2d 122 (1937); Barker
v. United States, 88 Ct. Cl. 468, 26 F. Supp. 1004 (1939).
5. Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281, 64 Sup. Ct. 596
(1944).
6. United States v. Mahoning Coal R. R. Co., 51 F. 2d 208 (1931). Note
that the court in holding this income to the lessor, stressed the fact that there was
no clear duty on the part of the lessor to repay the amount previously paid by the
lessee. Indicated that if there had been a clear duty to repay, the result might have
been different.
7. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Alamitos Land Co., 112 F. 2d 648
(1940). Note that this result was reached even though the account books of the
company contained a statement that the amount so received was subject to return
to the debtor, if the judgment was reversed.
8. Penn v. Robertson, 155 F. 2d 167 (1940).
9. Schramm v. United States, 36 F. Supp. 1021 (1941).
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above. In the Wilcox case, the taxpayer had embezzled and spent the money
and had been convicted. The Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Murphy, held
that this was not taxable income. It was said that the bare receipt of property or
money wholly belonging to another lacks the essential characteristics of a "gain"
or "profit" within the meaning of the Revenue Act. Taxable income was held not
to accrue from the mere receipt of property or money which one is obligated to
return or repay to the rightful owner. Here the law of the jurisdiction where the
facts occurred allowed the owner of the money to replevin the same as soon as
the appropriation was accomplished. This decision was strongly relied upon by the
court in the principal case, the court noting the injustice of taxing an honest man
while an embezzler is allowed to go tax free.
The principal case involves the receipt of an unauthorized bonus. Formerly
such bonuses were held income to the taxpayer receiving them." The case of
Greenwald v. United States1 2 was the first breach in this general rule. Greenwald
was vice-president and a stockholder in the Interstate Hosiery Mills, Inc., and
received a stipulated salary plus a certain per cent of the profits. During the period
in' question the books were falsified so as to show a larger profit then was actually
made. Plaintiff received his percentage and paid his income tax thereon. Upon
discovery of the fraud, plaintiff repaid the firm and sued for a refund. The
court, in an opinion by Madden, J., allowed recovery of the excessive tax paid
and said that the negligence of plaintiff, if any, in discovering the fraud would not
forf~it his right to a refund of taxes paid on income which he had not earned and did
not keep.
The dissenting judge in the principal case attempts to distinguish the Greenwald case on the ground that in that case there was a mistake as to the company's actual income because the books had been falsified. But in each case there is
10. Commissioner v. Wilcox, supra note 2. Also see McKnight v. Commissioner, 127 F. 2d 572 (1942) where the court said an embezzler who had spent the
money made no taxable gain. But in Kurrle v. Helvering, 126 F. 2d 723 (1942)
it was held that funds embezzled by an employee of a national bank, together with
"profits earned by the embezzler through their use, constituted a taxable gain to the
employee. Because of the 'element of profits in the Kurrle case, it does not seem
inconsistent with the results in the Wilcox and McKnigh" cases.
11. In National City Bank of New York v. Helvering, 98 F. 2d 93 (1938),
O'Neil was an officer of the Bank and received an illicit bonus on a contract negotiated by him for the Bank. The bonus was in the form of bonds. The income
was not reported as income, and after the death of O'Neil, his executor (Bank)
was assessed for the deficiency. The court said persons in possession of nroperty
may be taxed on such property as constituting income even though third parties
(Bank) may be entitled to recover the property from them.
In Saunders v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 101 F. 2d 407 (1939),
plaintiffs received a bonus of capital stock and paid a tax on the same, but subsequently returned a sum of money equivalent to the bonus under a threat of
litigation by the receiver of the corporation. The court refused to allow a recovery
for overpayment and said that revenue received under a claim of right and without
restrictions on its use and disposition, is taxable income, even though the person
receiving it may subsequently. be adjudged liable to restore it or its equivalent.
12. 57 F. Supp. 569 (1944).
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a mutual mistake which affects the claim of right. In the Wilcox case, the court
said that "a taxable gain is conditioned upon (1) the presence of a claim of right
to the alleged gain and (2) the absence of a definite, unconditional obligation to
repay or return that which would otherwise constitute a gain."'13 In that case the
government's claim to the tax failed under the second point. The gain in the
Greenwald and principal cases failed to meet the first condition.
Nevertheless, the latter cases seem to represent a departure from earlier decisions,14 and from the basic premise that income must be finally determined at the
end of each taxable year. The result may be to render non-taxable unauthorized
gains which the taxpayer is compelled to restore within the period for claiming
refunds. Undoubtedly this would be a fair result so far as the taxpayer is concerned, and, as pointed out in the Gargaro case, it seems unlikely that it will
seriously interfere with the Government's revenues.
CHARLES B. FITZGERALD
VENDOR AND PURCHASER-CoNTRACT FOR RECORD TITLE-AFFIDAVIT OF ADVERSE
POSSESSION TO CLEAR TITLE

Johnson & Co. v. Mueller'
The contract for the conveyance of land in the .principal case was treated by
the parties and by the court as requiring the vendor to furnish an abstract showing
merchantable title. A material break appeared in the abstract of title and the
purchaser refused to perform. The vendor sought specific performance of the contract and. at the trial attempted, for the first time,, to establish his title by testimony
of witnesses proving adverse possession for thirty-eight years. The trial court's
denial of specific performance was affirmed.
The vendor relied upon the following quoted portions of two Missouri cases,
Danzer v. Moerschel,2 and Reeves v. Roberts,3 to substantiate her theory that'
proof of adverse possession would entitle her to specific performance.
In Danzer v. Moerschel4 the supreme court said: "It may be granted that, in
a suit for the specific performance of a contract for a marketable title, a title by
adverse possession, if adequately proved, is sufficient to justify a judgment for the
vendor." (Italics added) That case in'olved a contract to deliver an abstract
showing a good title. Recognizing a distinction between a contract requiring a
record title and a contract requiring a mere merchantable title, the court held
13. Supra, note 2.
14. In North American Oil Consolidated v. Burner, 286 U. S. 417, 52 Sup.
Ct. 613 (1932) oil land owned by the plaintiff was in the hands of a receiver and
income from the lands for 1916 was paid by the plaintiffs to the receiver. In 1922 the
plaintiff's title to the land was upheld and the money was returned. Brandeis,
J. said the contingency of never receiving the money back did not make it nontaxable in 1916. See also the cases supra note 11.
1. 205 S.W. 2d 521 (Mo. 1947).
2. Danzer v. Moerschel, 214 S.W. 849. 7 A.L.R. 1162 (Mo. 1919).
3. Reeves v. Roberts, 294 Mo. 593i 242 S.W. 956 (1922).
,
4. Supra, note 2.
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that a contract requiring an abstract showing a good title required a record title
and that title by adverse possession outside the record was not pnough; so, the
title attempted to be shown by affidavits of adverse possession was not in compliance with the contract. 5 The quoted portion above was mere dicta, applying only
to a contract not calling for a record title. Further, the court does not state what
"adequately proved" means, and does not indicate whether affidavits would be adequate proof.
In Reeves v. RobertsO the supreme court said: "It is true that a marketable
title may be shown by affidavits, which connect up the showing made by the record
title. Title by adverse possession may perhaps be so shown; and thus a marketable
title shown." (Italics added) A break in the chain of title appeared in the abstract
where a deed was to Ida M. Smith and the next conveyance was from Amy A.
Smith. In an attempt to clear up this break, ex parte affidavits to identify Amy
A. Smith as Ida M. Smith appeared in the abstract. 7 The court held that an error
of this type in a deed of record could not be corrected by mere ex parte affidavits.
The quoted portion above was mere dicta, applying only to a contlact not calling
for a record title. But, even there, the language expretses doubt whether title by
adverse possession may be so shown.
And, in the principal case the supreme court says: "If . . . she (vendor) had
attached affidavits to her abstract of title adequately showing adverse or peaceable possession for the statutory periods; and had tendered her warranty deed, she
would have been in a stronger position."
From the dicta in these three supreme court cases should we infer that affidavits of adverse possession will cure defects in the record title so as to comply with
a *contract requiring record title?
The proposed Title Standards for the Missouri Bar provide for the acceptance of
affidavits in certain instances, especially where the affidavit has been recorded for a
number of years.8 However, none of the recommendations mention the use of
5. The report of'the case did not mention whether the affidavits had been
placed of record, but it is assumed that they were recorded since they appeared
in the abstract. The sufficiency of the particular affidavits was not considered by
the court; the court said generally that affidavits of adverse possession would not
comply with the contract.
6. Supra, note 3.
7. The report of the case did not mention whether the affidavits had been
placed of record, but it is assumed that they were recorded since they appeared
in the abstract. The sufficiency of the particular affidavits was attacked since
the conveyance questioned was recent and no affidavits were furnished by the
grantor, only by the grantee. Other affidavits were offered at the trial, but were
refused admission.
8. Title Standards of The Missouri Bar, 4 J. Mo. BAR. 40 (1948):
Sec. 7: Recitals of death and heirship in the affidavit contained in
an application for letters of administration or testamentary, or in a deed
from a person recited to be an heir, should be accepted without further
requirement as sufficient evidence of the truth of such recitals, where the
affidavits or deed has been of record not less than 31 years, unless controverted by other entries in the abstract.
Sec. 8: Intestacy may be presumed and administration waived,
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affidavits of adverse possession to cure old breaks in the chain-of title. In certain
instances where there is a very old break in the chain of title, it might be advisable
to permit the use of such affidavits since it would greatly decrease the costs of
litigation and simplify title requirements. However, the contents of the affidavits
in each case would determine whether they were of sufficient value to bridge this
break in the chain of title.
Generally, affidavits are inadmissible as evidence, and it has been held that
a mere ex parte affidavit as to adverse possession, even when placed of record, is
purely hearsay and inadmissible as evidence in the courts, and is not record evidence of title.9 This has been so held even where a statute authorized the recording of affidavits to explain defects in a chain of title.10
Contrary to the dicta in the three Missouri Supreme Court cases above cited
is Williams v. Ellis,"- a Kansas City Court of Appeals case. Therein a contract
required thevendor to furnish an abstract of title showing good merchantable title.
There was a break in the title shown by the abstract. The vendor attempted to
show in the abstract affidavits of adverse possession and payment of taxes for
thirty-five years. The court held that the vendor had not complied with his contract since the affidavits were not sufficient to clear the defects in the chain of
13
title.12 Cases in other jurisdictions are in accord.
In view of the Missouri cases herein set out, it is submitted that where a contract requires the vendor to furnish an abstract showing record title, it is doubtful
whether recorded affidavits of adverse possession bridging a break in the title and
appearing in the abstract are sufficient to comply with the contract; recorded
deeds of release from all possible adverse claimants or a suit to quiet title would be
necessary to establish the required record title.
C. DUDLEY BRANDOM

where the abstract of title contains satisfactory information either by
affidavit or deed recital as to date of death, place of domicile, heirship
and intestacy, and probate of the estate is not shown, and it further
appears that the deceased has been dead more than 10 years.
9. Owens v. Jackson, 35 S.W. 186 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Adkins v.
Gillespie, 189 S.W. 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916); Cline v. Booty, 175 S.W. 1081 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1915).
10. Crenshaw v. True, 295 S.W. 632 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); Upton v. Smith,
183 Iowa 588, 166 N.W. 268 (1918); Fagan v. Hook, 134 Iowa 381, 105 N.W.
155 (1905).
11. Williams v. Ellis, 239 S.W. 157 (Mo. App. 1922).
12. The report of the case did not mention whether the affidavits had been
placed of record, but it is assumed that they were recorded since they appeared in
the abstract. The sufficiency of these particular affidavits might be questioned since
some conflict existed between the affidavits furnished.
13. Vicker v. O'Connor, 218 Wis. 216, 260 N.W. 426 (1935); Zunker v.
Kuehn, 113 Wis. 421, 88 N.W. 605 (1902); Myrick v. Leddy, 37 S.W. 2d 308 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1931); Beeler v. Sims, 93 Kan. 213, 144 P. 237, also reported in 91
Kan. 757, 139 P. 371 (1914).
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